Chapter Ten
Reflections:
“On 11 February 1969,” Nic Dunlop writes, “a decision was made in the US that was to condemn Cambodia to ruin” (Dunlop, 2005: 69).
Throughout my time in Cambodia, my status as an American has plagued me. During “Operation Menu” and “Operation Freedom Deal,” the United States decimated Cambodia through B-52 airstrikes. Aimed at the People’s Army of Vietnam, the U.S. escalated its use of tactical air strikes to carpet bombings. T-28 attacks also showered Cambodia with napalm (2005: 72). By 1973, the U.S. had dropped 2.7 million tons of bombs on Cambodia. In stark contrast, throughout the entirety of World War II, the Allied Powers only dropped around 2 million tons of bombs—including the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hundreds of thousands of Cambodian civilians were killed by the hands of the United States (Graber 2013).
The attacks on Cambodia were intensely secretive. President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wanted to ensure that newspapers would never report this assualt. Kissinger even wanted to deceive B-52 pilots, so that the crew would not know they were actually bombing Cambodia. In the end, Nixon’s Cabinet conducted cover missions and false reports to bury the United States’ involvement in Cambodia—and to not add fodder to the anti-Nixon protests. International law and diplomatic relations were not considered (Hersh, 1984). Information on earlier bombings, from 1965-1969, were not made public until the 2000s through the Clinton administration (Graber, 2013).
The impact of the US bombings on the rise of the Khmer Rouge is in dispute. However, many historians affirm that Cambodian’s support for the Khmer Rouge is intrinsically linked to the United States. Because of the bombings, families fled rural farms and congregated in Phnom Penh—creating the beginning of Cambodia’s food crisis. The bombing also radicalized Cambodians in rural areas. The American attacks advanced the Khmer Rouge movement, turning the countryside into a “massive, dedicated and effective rural base” (Graber, 2013). Taylor Owen (2006) concluded that the United States strikes in Cambodia “drove an enraged populace into the arms of an insurgency that had enjoyed relatively little support until the bombings began, setting in motion the expansion of the Vietnam War deeper into Cambodia, a coup d’état in 1970, the rapid rise of the Khmer Rouge, and ultimately the Cambodian genocide” (Owen, 2006).
I often find small reminders of this history. The trial records of the Khmer Rouge leaders frequently cite the United States’ presence in Cambodia. In boutiques, Khmer women sell jewelry constructed from bombshell casings. Expat bars feature B-52 shots, at a reduced price for happy hour. And when asked where I am from, a now familiar mix of guilt and shame radiates from my heart and throughout my limbs
Dunlop (2005) recalls that when asked about the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, one Cambodian man questioned its motive. The man asked why Khmer Rouge leaders were put on trial, but no actions were taken against the United States (2005: 292). Throughout my internship at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, my supervisor often asked me, “what is justice in this situation?” when discussing our work at the court.
So, what is justice in this situation? I still have no answer.
“I love America more than any other country in this world,
and, exactly for this reason,
I insist on the right to criticize her perpetually.”
James Baldwin