Published Research by Center Fellows

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Lynda L. Butler
Chancellor Professor of Law, Emerita, and Director, William & Mary Property Rights Project
  • Property's Problem with Extremes, 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (2020). SSRN.
  • Murr v. Wisconsin and the Inherent Limits of Regulatory Takings, 47 Fla. St. L. Rev. 99 (2020). SSRN.
  • Property as a Management Institution, 82 Brook. L. Rev. 1215 (2017). SSRN.
  • The Horne Dilemma: Protecting Property's Richness and Frontiers, 75 Md. L. Rev. 787 (2016). SSRN.
  • The Governance Function of Constitutional Property, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1687 (2015). SSRN.
  • The Resilience of Property, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 847 (2013). SSRN.
  • The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within Nature's Boundaries, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 927 (2000). SSRN.
  • The Politics of Takings: Choosing the Appropriate Decisionmaker, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 749 (1997). Online.
Kevin S. Haeberle
Professor of Law
  • Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws, J. Fin. Reg. 254 (2021). SSRN.
  • The Emergence of the Actively Managed ETF, 2021 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1321 (2021) (Columbia Business Law Review's 2021 Future of the Securities Regulation Symposium edition). SSRN.
  • Information Asymmetry and the Protection of Ordinary Investors, 53 UC Davis L. Rev. 145 (2019). SSRN.
  • A New Market-Based Approach for Securities Law, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1313 (2018) (with M. Todd Henderson). SSRN.
  • Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure, 35 Yale J. Reg. 2 (2018) (with M. Todd Henderson). SSRN.
  • Discrimination Platforms, 42 J. Corp. L. 809 (2017). SSRN.
  • Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and Their Regulation, 42 J. Corp. L. 887 (2017) (with Merritt B. Fox). SSRN.
  • Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1373 (2016) (with M. Todd Henderson). SSRN.
  • Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies' Stock Prices, 2015 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 121 (2015), reprinted in Securities Law Review. SSRN.
Darian M. Ibrahim
Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law
  • A Tokenized Future: Regulatory Lessons from Crowdfunding and Standard Form Contracts, 74 Hast. L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2022). SSRN.
  • Corporate Venture Capital, 24 U. Penn. J. Bus. L. 209 (2021). Online.
  • Underwriting Crowdfunding, 25 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 289 (2020). SSRN.
  • Public or Private Venture Capital, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 1137 (2019). SSRN
  • Crowdfunding Signals, 53 Ga. L. Rev. 197 (2019). SSRN.
  • Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 1481 (2017). Online.
  • Intrapreneurship, 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1741 (2016). SSRN.
  • Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 Minnesota L. Rev. 561 (2015). SSRN.
  • Co-author, Delaware's Familiarity, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 271 (2015) (with Brian Broughman). SSRN.
  • Co-author, Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & Econ. 865 (2014) (with Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried). SSRN.
  • Co-author, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1533 (2013) (with D. Gordon Smith) (invited submission). SSRN.
  • Should Angel-Backed Start-Ups Reject Venture Capital?, 2 Mich. J. Private Equity & Venture Cap. L. 251 (2013). SSRN.
  • The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (2012). SSRN.
  • Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 Ill. L. Rev. 1169 (2010). SSRN.
  • Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 717 (2010). SSRN.
  • Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 929 (2008). SSRN.
  • The (Not so) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1405 (2008). SSRN.
Alan J. Meese
Ball Professor of Law
  • Federalism, Free Competition, and Sherman Act Preemption of State Restraints, 16 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 115 (2021). SSRN.
  • Requiem for a Lightweight: How NCAA Continues to Distort Antitrust Doctrine, 56 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1103 (2021). SSRN.
  • Will the Supreme Court Recover its Own Fumble? How Alston Can Repair the Damage From NCAA's Sports League Exemption, 11 Wake Forest L. Rev. Online 70 (2021). SSRN.
  • Wickard Through an Antitrust Lens, 60 Wm. L. Rev. 1335 (2019) (invited submission). SSRN.
  • The Rule of Reason’s Prima Facie Case: Did Harvard Get it Right?, 70 U. Penn. L. Rev. Online ___ (forthcoming 2021) (invited submission).

  • Antitrust Regulation and the Federal-State Balance: Restoring the Original Design, 70 Am. U. L. Rev. ____ (2020) (forthcoming).

  • Co-author, Were the 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?, 13 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 577 (Oxford 2017)(with Sarah L. Stafford). Online.

  • Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2013 (2017) (invited submission). Online.
  • In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 Geo. L.J. 835 (2016). SSRN.
  • Co-author, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 Harvard L. Rev. F. 273 (2014) (with Nathan B. Oman). SSRN.
  • Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2161 (2015) (invited submission for Centennial Symposium). SSRN.
  • Antitrust, Regulatory Harm and Economic Liberty, 99 Iowa L. Rev. Bulletin 115 (2014). SSRN.
  • Robert Bork's Forgotten Role in the Transaction Cost Revolution, 79 Antitrust L.J. 953 (2014). SSRN.
  • Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 255 (2014). SSRN.
  • Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance is Misguided and Futile, 40 Fla. St. L. Rev. 908 (2013). SSRN.
  • Market Power and Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1291 (2013). SSRN.
  • Reframing the (False?) Choice Between Purchaser Welfare and Total Welfare: How the Partial Equilibrium Trade-off Model Distorts Normative Antitrust Debate, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2197 (2013). (invited submission) SSRN.
  • Standard Oil as Lochner's Trogan Horse, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 783 (2012). SSRN.
  • Section 2 Enforcement and the Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (GDP), 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1633 (2012). SSRN.
  • Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 Hastings L.J. 457 (2010). SSRN.
  • Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 659 (2010). SSRN.
  • Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1775 (2006). SSRN.
  • Exclusive Dealing, the Theory of the Firm, and Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward a New Synthesis, 50 Antitrust Bulletin 371 (2005). SSRN.
  • Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. Competition Law and Economics 21 (2005). SSRN.
  • Monopolization, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 743 (2005). SSRN.
  • Property, Aspen, and Refusals to Deal, 73 Antitrust L. J. 81 (2005). SSRN.
  • Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 553 (2004). SSRN.
  • Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 5 (2004). SSRN.
  • Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 Ill. L. Rev. 77. SSRN.
  • The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1629 (2002). SSRN.
  • Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. (2001). SSRN.
  • Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 Antitrust L. J. 461 (2000). SSRN.
  • Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1999). SSRN.
  • Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, 44 Antitrust Bulletin 65 (1999). SSRN.
  • Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and the Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States?, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 61 (1999). SSRN.
  • Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1 (1997). SSRN.
  • Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 143 (1997). SSRN.
  • Will, Judgment and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (1999). SSRN.
  • Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 111 (1996). SSRN.
  • Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders, or Abridgement of Expression?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 305 (1993). SSRN.
  • Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis, 23 Creighton L. Rev. 513 (1990). SSRN.
Nathan B. Oman
Rollins Professor of Law
  • Markets and Contractual Fairness, 17 Europ. Rev. Contract L. 211 (2021). Online.
  • Doux Commerce in the City of God: Trade and the Mormon Idea of Zion, in Reapproaching Zion: New Essays on Mormon Social Thought 131 (Nathan B. Oman & Samuel Brunson eds., Common Consent Press 2020). SSRN.
  • Contract Law and the Liberalism of Fear, 20 Theo. Inquiries in L. 381 (2019). SSRN.
  • Beyond Gift and Bargain: Some Suggestions for Increasing Kidney Donations by Generating Trust in NEAD Chains, 81 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37 (2018) (invited submission). Online.
  • Commerce, Religion, and the Rule of Law, 6 J.L. Rel. & St. 213 (2018). SSRN.
  •  Reconsidering  Contractual Consent: Why We Shouldn't Worry Too Much About Boilerplate and Other Puzzles, 83 Brook. L. Rev. 215 (2017). SSRN.
  • The Dignity of Commerce: Markets and the Moral Foundations of Contract Law, University of Chicago Press 2017.
  • Doux Commerce, Religion, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 92 Ind. L.J. 693 ( 2016). SSRN.
  • Need for a Law of Church and Market, 64 Duke L.J. Online 141 (2015). SSRN.
  • Co-Author, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 Harvard L. Rev. F. 273 (2014) (with Alan Meese). SSRN.
  • Markets as a Moral Foundation of Contract Law, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 183 (2012). SSRN.
  • A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 Georgetown L. J. 77 (2009). SSRN.
  • The Failure of Economic Interpretations of Contract Damages, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 829 (2007). SSRN.
  • Book Review, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1483 (2005). SSRN.
  • Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 101 (2005). SSRN.
  • Statutory Interpretation in Econotopia, 25 Pace L. Rev. 49 (2004). SSRN.
Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec
Professor of Law and Engh Research Professor
  • Infringement, Unbound, 32 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 117 (2018). SSRN.
  • The Intellectual Property Hostage in Trade Retaliation, 76 Md. L. Rev. 169 (2016). SSRN.
  • Patents Absent Adversaries, 81 Brook. L. Rev. 1073 (2016). SSRN.
  • Free Trade in Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for Patents, 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 317 (2014). SSRN.
  • Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 733 (2012). SSRN.
Sarah L. Stafford
Professor of Economics, Public Policy and Law
  • Co-author, Developing a Framework to Identify Local Business and Government Vulnerability to Sea-Level Rise: A Case Study of Coastal Virginia, 47 J. Coastal Management 44 (2019) (with Alexander D. Renaud). Online.

  • Co-author, The Clean Air Act Watch List and Federal Oversight of State Enforcement Efforts, 93 J. Envtl. Econ. & Management 170 (2019) (with Mary F. Evans). Online.

  • Co-author, Were the 1982 Merger Guidelines Old News?, 13 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 577 (Oxford 2017) (with Alan J. Meese). Online.
  • Environmental Management Systems and Compliance at Small and Lightly Regulated Facilities: Evidence from the New Hampshire Hazardous Waste Program, 49 J. Reg. Econ. 292 (2016). Springer.
  • Standardization and the Impacts of Voluntary Program Participation: Evidence from Environmental Auditing, 43 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 10 (2015). Elsevier.
  • Do Carrots Work? Examining the Effectiveness of EPA's Compliance Assistance Program, 31J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 533 (2012). Wiley Online.
  • Private Policing of Environmental Performance: Does It Serve Public Goals?, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 73 (2012). SSRN.
  • Co-author, Do Environmental Audits Improve Long-Term Compliance: Evidence from Manufacturing Facilities in Michigan, 40 J. Reg. Econ. 279 (2011). Online.
  • Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide Self-Policing Regimes, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 2293 (2011). SSRN.
  • Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime, 74 S. Econ. Rev. 934 (2008). JSTOR.
  • Can Consumers Enforce Environmental Regulations? The Role of the Market in Hazardous Waste Compliance, 31 J. Reg. Econ. 83 (2007). Springer.
  • Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing, 26 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 305 (2007). Wiley Online.
  • Does Self-Policing Help the Environment? EPA's Audit Policy and Hazardous Waste Compliance, 6 Vermont J. Envt. L. 1 (2005). Hein Online.
  • Progress Toward Title IX Compliance: The Effect of Formal and Informal Enforcement Mechanisms, 85 Soc. Sci. Qtr. 1469 (2004). Wiley Online.
James Y. Stern
Professor of Law

  • Right on Time: First Possession in Property and Intellectual Property, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 395 (2019) (with Dolan Oliar). SSRN.

  • The Essential Structure of Property Law, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1167 (2017). SSRN.
  • Property, Exclusivity, and Jurisdiction, 100 Va. L. Rev. 111 (2014). SSRN.
  • Property's Constitution, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 277 (2013). SSRN.
  • ABC v. Aereo and the Humble Judge, 9 NYU J.L. Liberty 81 (2015). SSRN.
  • Indirect Purchaser Suits and Jurisdictional Competition, Global Comp. Rev. (2013). SSRN