Week 10: Harvest
In my final week at USIP, I spent my time creating an evaluative framework based on my research and analysis of the case studies I created. My framework includes benchmarks for success and failure, determinative factors, and a theory of success or failure for each factor. The determinative factors for success or failure of non-state security groups and state engagement of these groups are broken into three categories: method of creation, accountability, and nature of engagement. Based on my research, I have found that groups that are created through community-initiated deliberative processes that set clear boundaries for their operations; are raised on an ad hoc basis and have an oversight mechanism tied to their communities; and are engaged by the state through their existing hierarchy and structures on a limited basis tend to be more stable, enjoy popular legitimacy, respect the rule of law and their respective national/state governments, and be easier to translate to different communities through the same processes. These types of groups also tend to be motivated in the community interest and better able to reintegrate back into their communities, ensuring they do not suffer from mission creep—meaning they stay within the confines of their original security mandates.
For example, the arbakai in Afghanistan are raised only for limited purposes to carry out or enforce jirga decisions, and the jirgas are representative of their communities and composed of respected community or tribal leaders. Because the arbakai are raised through a deliberative process that sets clear boundaries for their existence, they have gained popular legitimacy in their communities and have existed in substantially the same form since their inception predating the Afghan nation-state. In contrast, the autodefensas in Mexico were formed after a man named Jose Mireles rallied people in his neighborhood to rise up and take back control from drug cartels. Because there was no deliberative or collective process for raising the autodefensas, they quickly proliferated beyond Mireles's control and devolved into extortion and abuse of the same people they originally formed to protect.
While the framework I have come up with is relatively straightforward, creating the framework required me not only to compile a diverse set of case studies, but also to work backward from unsuccessful cases to determine which ones I thought were successful. I also reworked the framework several times because I found that when I first started, I had confused benchmarks for success—meaning positive characteristics of the groups—and the reasons for that success. I was answering the what and not the how or the why of the problem. I also had to check a lot of my assumptions because there were several times when I would instinctively think, X group is successful and it has Y factor so that must be why it is successful. It was only when I broadened my case studies to include a wider range that I found that many of my original factors were either important but not the determinative factors, or they were determinative only when considered in conjunction with other factors.
Many times, I found that even when the factors all seemed to be present, the state engagement was still unsuccessful, or it was successful for a period of time and suddenly turned. How could I explain this phenomenon? While there are key factors that make groups and state engagement of those groups positive examples, those factors cannot be viewed as discrete check boxes. Rather, all of the factors interact with one another, so it was important that I framed my analysis by first looking at the big picture—by finding the turning point and thinking critically about the surrounding context.
One example is the Zande Arrow Boys of South Sudan. This group was raised by a deliberative community process, was organized and hierarchical, with an oversight mechanism tied to the community. It was deeply embedded in its community. But, the Zande Arrow Boys ended up fighting openly against the South Sudanese government. What was the reason for the shift? I could only answer this question by looking at the broader country context and the interaction of the different factors.
Creating this framework started out as a simple idea, but much like the case studies I analyzed, I quickly came to understand that it was much more complex than I originally contemplated. After 10 weeks, I feel like I have learned so much about each of these groups, about the security sector generally, about conflict analysis, and yet I still feel like there is much more to be learned. I am hopeful that USIP will be able to use my research to start new projects in the Sahel and Maghreb. My research is just a seed, but with time and a little work, I'm confident it can grow into something greater.
Speaking of seeds, here's a picture of my garden in Williamsburg, which after 10 weeks, is still alive and even has some veggies growing!
