Week 8: Research Update
I can't believe it has already been eight weeks. Time flies when you're having fun! It feels like I just started researching for my project, and I feel like I could keep researching for another ten weeks and still have more to find. I always feel like there is more I could do with my projects, and this one is no exception. Trying to figure out how states can engage with non-state security forces has so many important implications for fragile states. Recommending engagement without considering the potential negative consequences could be detrimental to states that are emerging from or on the brink of armed conflict.
While I feel like I have a good grasp on key group characteristics and factors for state engagement, I also feel like eight weeks is nowhere near enough time to cover this topic completely. It has also been difficult to classify engagements as successful or not; oftentimes groups vacillate between legitimate security providers and violent militias, and state actions too shift back and forth between positive and negative engagements. Sometimes, it even looks on paper like a state is taking all the right actions to engage non-state security forces, but the act of positively engaging changes the structure of the group, diminishing the very characteristics of the group that made it favorable for engagement in the first place.
For example, some groups exist within tribal, ancestral, or communal structures, and these structures provide an effective oversight mechanism for the group. The group, therefore, may be operating successfully because it is firmly rooted in the community it polices; it has an ethical code, jurisdictional mandate, and a power structure created and approved by the community.
But, because the state (national government) sees this group as effective and safe, it decides to provide monetary funding for the group in exchange for an agreement by the group that it will only act when the government asks it to act (often by only enforcing state or national laws). While this is a positive action by the state, it fundamentally changes the nature of the group. The group will lose its strong community-oriented mindset, and the introduction of outside funding also shifts motives away from community protection and preservation to income-seeking.
Such was the case when the Afghan government incorporated the arbakai into its payroll and hierarchy in 2007. While the arbakai are a flexible and stable group, and the government intended to leave the jirga-led power structure in place, the act of incorporating the arbakai caused tensions within arbakai groups and between the arbakai and Afghan National Police, who were paid higher wages for similar services.
Similarly, in Peru, the rondas campesinas have a long history of providing vital security services for their communities on a volunteer basis, enforcing communal values and doling out punishments approved of by the community. The rondas have a mixed relationship with the state, but they have been officially recognized both in statutory and constitutional law as a legitimate and autonomous force. However, because they are recognized in law--indeed, the Peruvian government engaged the rondas to combat the Shining Path insurgency--the state has since tried to restrict the activities of the rondas. The state claims it will allow the rondas to continue to operate with autonomy so long as they respect human rights and only enforce formal laws. (Note: The rondas frequently dole out corporal punishments and subject people to forced labor to pay for their crimes, but the community is generally fine with these actions.) The rondas see this as the government trying to diminish the autonomy they were granted by law; this feeling is made worse by the government's history of complicity in cattle-rustling, the original reason for the rondas' creation.
Thus, the government's incorporation of the rondas into law fundamentally changed the dynamic between the government and the rondas for the worse. On the other hand, when states fail to recognize the legitimate contributions made by non-state security forces, or when states campaign against the groups, the groups have a tendency to mobilize the strong community support and popularity they enjoy against the state. This exact phenomenon occurred in Cote d'Ivoire when the Bedie government engaged the dozos to secure polling stations, and after being elected--in part thanks to the security provided by the dozos--began to demonize the dozos, angering the group and igniting ethnic tensions across the country. The dozos later went on to support Outtarra in his campaign against Gbagbo in the Ivoirian civil war.
Similarly, in South Sudan, the Zande Arrow boys have successfully secured their communities, and by extension, the entire country, from deadly attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda. While the national government sent some army (SPLA) members to the border to provide security, the SPLA did not see their mission as a priority, instead instigating skirmishes with ethnically Zande communities across the border in the DRC and CAR. This left Zande communities in Western Equatoria in South Sudan vulnerable to deadly attacks by the LRA. Locals in Western Equatoria, perceived the SPLA actions to be part of the ethnically Dinka government's policy of discrimination against them. The Zande Arrow Boys have now mobilized against the national government and call for total dissolution and reconstruction of security forces.
Thus, it seems there is a fine line between complete endorsement, outright rejection, and passive acceptance. Somewhere on this line is the opportune point for state engagement of non-state security providers.
Is your head spinning yet? Now you know how I feel while researching these groups. Each time I label a group or engagement as successful, I find more information that makes me re-assess and challenge my conclusions. By the end of next week, I will complete my analysis of these factors and synthesize which factors can be applied to groups in Nigeria and Burkina Faso.