Preventing Extremism in the Sahel
Since the end of the first workshop that took place in Burkina Faso last week, my work has shifted to a more regional focus. As such, I have been looking at armed groups in Mali and Niger, with a focus on jihadist groups that have unfortunately expanded over the Sahel. The Sahel is a puzzling region that often makes the headlines for its growing role in the fight against terrorism. Indeed, with the gradual fall of the Islamic State, jihadists are seemingly expanding their dominion over sub-Saharan Africa, which has led the Sahel to be called “the corridor of all dangers.”
For instance, there are a myriad of jihadist armed groups in Mali that have spurred the creation of self-defense militias who become active when the government fails to take action to protect its citizens. And while this phenomenon is predominant in Mali, similar patterns have begun to unfold in Burkina Faso and Niger. Aware of this new threat, USIP’s Task Force recently published a report on preventing extremism in fragile states. At the core of this publication lies the idea that counterterrorism is costly and fails to address the root causes of the issue: extremism. In other words, if terrorism is a symptom, extremism is the disease.
Today, the Sahel is the region where one can hope to implement a new strategy that seeks to prevent extremism before delving into counterterrorism measures. My research on Mali and the spillover effects that armed groups in the country had on the greater Sahel region shows that this new strategy could be more effective in the long run.