Political Horse-Trading in Jakarta
There is a delightful quiescence in the public mood at present, a calm following the storm. The controversial election is generally accepted as having been settled, and settled appropriately. This is due in no small part to Prabowo Subianto’s profound change in tone. Where before he led accusations of corruption and demanded direct action, he now urges reconciliation, and appears to have resigned himself to acting within the confines of electoral democracy. Additionally, the authoritative stamp of the Constitutional Court has reassured Indonesians that the last election represented the country’s democratic will, and dismissed unfounded allegations of underhand influence.
Behind the scenes, however, the political maelstrom whirls as furiously as ever, with Indonesia’s innumerable parties jostling in a tumultuous froth around the centre of power in President Joko Widodo. Jokowi’s PDI-P party may hold the reins of power, but in the legislative elections its grasp amounted to less than twenty percent of the overall vote, bringing with it a similar percentage of the available seats. A coalition is thus in order, but the vast assortment of potential allies and opponents, each with their own allegiances and rivalries, complicates the process.
Gerindra, the party of Jokowi’s opponent Prabowo, demands a certain degree of conciliation, in return for stability. The party came, in the course of the election, to speak for the forty-five-odd percent of the country that rejected Jokowi, on grounds that range from religious conservatism to concerns about foreign investment. The strength of feeling evidenced in the May riots in Jakarta, despite being a factor fundamentally repugnant to stable electoral government, must be taken into account.
That said, Gerindra’s vote share was barely higher than that of the third party, Golkar, which ultimately took more seats. Golkar is a sort of old guard party in Indonesia, constructed to ensure stable centrism - in its initial form, it was created as an alternative to political parties and factionalism, and only later developed into a political party itself. Golkar aligns relatively comfortably with the PDI-P’s positions, and supported Jokowi in the presidential election. Taking them into coalition should not create insurmountable issues.
The next two parties, PKB and Nasdem, with just over nine percent of the vote apiece, were Jokowi allies along with Golkar. Less centrist than Golkar, they represent slightly more difficult visions to square with Jokowi’s broad centrist-reformist goals. Of the two, the PKB, a moderate Islamic party with a mild conservative agenda, is the more easygoing. It currently seems willing to support a coalition of all, or nearly all, the parties, as currently appears to be under consideration. Nasdem, by contrast, is hostile to the inclusion of Prabowo’s Gerindra and its allies within the coalition, and would prefer that they remain outside as a cohesive opposition. Nasdem has described its position here as strengthening democracy, in that having a functional opposition provides an essential challenge to the ruling government, encouraging ideological debate and avoiding the lumbering bulk that defined government during Indonesia’s collapse in the New Order era. Peculiarly, Nasdem has also recently voiced support for the future presidential candidacy of Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan, who deposed Jokowi’s staunch ally Ahok and took his place in a religiously-charged crusade that wound up imprisoning Ahok for blasphemy. These factors may make their inclusion in Jokowi’s coalition more challenging.
Following Nasdem, the PKS, with around eight percent of the vote, is an Islamist party that owes its origins to the Muslim Brotherhood. Close behind was the Democratic Party led by ex-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a centrist party that nonetheless sided with Prabowo in the presidential election. Not far behind the Democratic Party was the PAN, or National Mandate Party, which took a leading role during the election in Prabowo’s call for direct action. All three of these parties supported Prabowo, but for different reasons and with different interests in a coalition. Their inclusion may prove more troublesome, as their goals are diverse and in some areas considerably more extreme than those of the larger parties. Although individually their vote share was relatively minor, they may be able to leverage their support for Prabowo in demanding power.
At the bottom, the Jokowi-allied PPP offers little controversy for Jokowi’s coalition, although it also brings little strength, at a mere four and a half percent of the national vote. Again moderately Islamic, it will likely voice mild conservative positions diverging little from similar parties with a higher vote share.
Jokowi’s current intention appears to be to generate as large a coalition as possible to mark the reunification of a divided electorate. To an extent, he may be able to incorporate a great number of these visions within an overall broad centrism. However, he may struggle with challenges in the hostility between smaller members of his and Prabowo’s rival coalitions. Rewarding his supporters in Nasdem, for example, would presumably require bowing to their insistence on the exclusion of PAN, which was a key ally of the opposition and which will likely be demanding that Prabowo now provide a degree of power and influence through his dealings with Jokowi.
A considerable period of political horse-trading looks to be in order, as ministerial positions are allotted and parties find their place in the incipient ruling coalition. While Indonesian politics now maintains a placid exterior, and has largely faded from international, and even national headlines, political combat continues as ever, and is likely to continue on for some time.