The PDI-P against its president
Now that the elections have settled, the next stage in the process is the establishment of a government. Jokowi has finalized his cabinet, and positions within the structure of the legislative bodies are being allotted according to political strength and a complicated network of allegiances. The balancing act that this entails often seems to lead to surprising alliances, and parties that were recently accusing each other of the attempted destruction of the nation now find themselves shaking hands and agreeing to cooperate for their mutual benefit.
One particularly peculiar element of this regularization of the political structure is the relationship between the president, Joko Widodo, and his own party, the PDI-P, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. This relationship has lately appeared rather threatening, if not downright hostile.
To those more used to a two-party system, in which the choice is usually stark and allegiances tend to be fairly clear, this is a rather baffling development. Even in the multiparty elections of Europe, which frequently rely on coalition government and complex and shifting allegiances, it is generally expected that a party will stand behind one of their own candidates who has successfully risen to the highest office of state.
However, this is not the case in Indonesia. The specific issue here is a move by the PDI-P to return to a previous iteration of the Indonesian constitution. Doing so would grant legislative supremacy over the executive, specifically in the ability to set a national agenda to determine national policy. This would override presidential initiative, and failure to comply on the part of the president would put him at risk of impeachment. Still more dubiously, this constitution enabled the legislature to elect a president without reference to the voting public. The latter would seem very difficult to thrust down the throat of a populace that has largely revelled in its relatively newfound (since 2004) direct presidential election. Suggesting such an indirect vote may be a ploy to allow the PDI-P to apparently compromise in retrenching to insist on the former, legislative assignment of national policy.
This assumption of authority by the legislature may seem perverse in that it undermines the role of the president, a member of the PDI-P, while favoring the necessarily more various legislature, thus incorporating views from other parties. Perhaps one explanation of this can be found in the realities of Indonesian politics, which frequently rely on temporary allegiances and a certain number of purposeful appointments that may reflect interests more particular than those of the party overall.
On this note, there has been an especially visible brouhaha over the appointments to the cabinet. While Jokowi has indicated his intentions of supporting a broad coalition of the assorted parties, allotting positions to a diverse range of politicians, the PDI-P has requested alternative arrangements. They have laid claim to the majority of the seats, on the basis that their party won both the largest number seats in the legislature over the other parties and the presidency itself, theoretically indicating that the country believes in them. That the legislative elections gave them a plurality, rather than an actual majority, and that the president is in fact the authority they are opposing in this effort, seems not to affect their demands.
The push for legislative supremacy may thus in part reflect a threat to levy against Jokowi should he fail to accede to their hunger for cabinet seats. However, it may more directly spring from the ambitions of Megawati Sukarnoputri. Megawati, the daughter of Indonesia’s founder Sukarno, is the leader of the PDI-P, and an ex-president herself. Undermining Jokowi may be a tempting policy for her on the grounds that she may appear, given her past and current position, the logical leader of the nation, if the elected president is powerless.
Megawati has been negotiating allegiances with, among others, Gerindra, the leading party of the opposition in the recent elections, helmed by Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi’s rival for the presidency. Prabowo has appeared in the press enjoying Megawati’s cooking as she hosted him for a meal, the implication being that they were now allies in the determination of Indonesia’s future. Gerindra has voiced its support for Megawati's proposal.
While Megawati may be able to negotiate the tortuous allegiances of Indonesian politics, weakening the presidency in favor of the legislature is a high-risk strategy. In addition to coming with the potential for a coalition of the other parties to override PDI-P policies, the public perception of this move may be less than favorable. While potentially appearing a sensible means of allowing a multitudinous body of qualified members with varied ideas to hash out the best possible policies, there is an unfortunate precedent. For many memorable years, Indonesia stagnated under the New Order dictatorship of Suharto, largely facilitated by the power invested in the legislature, to determine national policy without reference to the public will in democratic national elections to the presidency. Megawati’s demands have not as yet stretched so far. Already, though, there have been murmurings in the press of the potential implications here. For many Indonesians, these bitter memories are easily evoked.