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Law and Economics Published Papers

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Jayne Barnard

Lynda Butler

Eric Chason

Kevin S. Haeberle

Eric Kades

Alan Meese

Nathan Oman

Sarah Wasserman Rajec

Sarah Stafford

Jayne Barnard

James Cutler Professor of Law Emerita

• Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 Penn. St. L. Rev. 189 (2008).
• Corporate Philanthropy, Exectives' Pet Charities and the Agency Problem, 41 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1147 (1997) (invited submission).
• Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 1135 (1991).

Lynda Butler

Chancellor Professor of Law, Director, William & Mary Property Rights Project and Co-Chair, President's Committee on Sustainability

• The Resilience of Property, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 847 (2013).
• The Pathology of Property Norms:  Living Within Nature's Boundaries, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 927 (2000).

Eric Chason
Associate Professor of Law

• Extending the Taxation-of-Risk Model to Timing Options and Market-to-Market Taxes, 32 Virginia Tax. Rev. 485 (2013).
• The Uneasy Case for Deferring Banker Pay, 73 La. L. Rev. 923 (2013).
• Executive Compensation and Tax Neutrality: Taxing the Investment Component of Deferred Compensation, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1667 (2010).
• Extending the Taxation-of-Risk Model to Timing Options and Market-Market Taxes, 32 Virginia Tax Rev. 485 (2013).
• Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing The Fruit of the Tree in its Proper Season, 67 Ohio State L. J. 347 (2006).
• The Economic Ambiguity (and Possible Irrelevance of Tax Transition Rules, 22 Va. Tax. Rev. 615 (2003).

Kevin S. Haeberle

Professor of Law; Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Markets

• Fraud-on-the-Market Liability in the ESG Era, 98 Tulane L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2023) (draft available).
• The Emergence of the Actively Managed ETF, 2021 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1321 (COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW'S 2021 Future of the Securities Regulation Symposium edition)
• Marginal Benefits of the Core Securities Laws, 7 J. Fin. Reg. 254 (2021).
• Information Asymmetry and the Protection of Ordinary Investors, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 145 (2019) (reprinted in 2020 Sec. L. Rev. and selected for presentation at the Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum).
• A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1313 (2018) (with M. Todd Henderson)
• Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure, 35 Yale J. Reg. 2 (2018) (with M. Todd Henderson).
• Discrimination Platforms, 42 J. Corp. L. 809 (2017).
• Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and Their Regulation, 42 J. Corp. L. 887 (2017) (with Merritt B. Fox).
• Information-Dissemination Law: The Regulation of How Market-Moving Information Is Revealed, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1373 (2016) (with M. Todd Henderson).
• Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies' Stock Prices, 2015 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 121 (2015) (reprinted in 2017 Sec. L. Rev. and selected for presentation at the Center for Law, Economics, and Finance Junior Faculty Business and F

Eric Kades

Thomas Jefferson Professor of Law

• Preserving a Precious Resource: Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 Nw. U.L. Rev. 611 (2005).
• Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: The Contiuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 189 (2002).
• Freezing the Company Charter, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 111 (2000).
• The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of Amerindian Lands, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1065 (2000).
• Windfalls, 108 Yale L.J. 1489 (1999).

Alan Meese
Ball Professor of Law and Tazewell Taylor Research Professor of Law

• In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 Geo. L.J. 835 (2016).
• Co-author, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 Harvard L. Rev. F. 273 (2014) (with Nate Oman). 
• Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 2161 (2015) (invited submission for Centennial Symposium).
• Antitrust, Regulatory Harm and Economic Liberty, 99 Iowa L. Rev. Bulletin 115 (2014).
• Robert Bork's Forgotten Role in the Transcation Cost Revolution, 79 Antitrust L.J. 953 (2014).
• Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 255 (2014).
• Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance is Misguided and Futile, 40 Fla. St. L. Rev. 908 (2013).
• Market Power and Contract Formation: How Outmoded Economic Theory Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1291 (2013).
• Reframing the (False?) Choice BetweenPurchaser Welfare and Total Welfare: How the Partial Equilibrium Trade-off Model Distorts Normative Antitrust Debate, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2197 (2013). (invited submission) (PDF)
• Standard Oil as Lochner's Trogan Horse, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 783 (2012). (PDF)
• Section 2 Enforcement and the Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might Mean More (GDP), 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1633 (2012). (PDF)
• Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution: Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 Hastings L.J. 457 (2010).
• Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep it, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 659 (2010).
• Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1775 (2006).
• Exclusive Dealing, the Theory of the Firm, and Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward a New Synthesis, 50 Antitrust Bulletin 371 (2005).
• Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. Competition Law and Economics 21 (2005).
• Monopolization, Exclusion and the Theory of the Firm, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 743 (2005).
• Property, Aspen, and Refusals to Deal, 73 Antitrust L. J. 81 (2005).
• Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 553 (2004).
• Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 5 (2004).
• Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 Ill. L. Rev. 77.
• The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1629 (2002).
• Don't Disintegrate Microsoft (Yet), 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. (2001).
• Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of Reason, 68 Antitrust L. J. 461 (2000).
• Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1999).
• Monopoly Bundling in Cyberspace: How Many Products Does Microsoft Sell?, 44 Antitrust Bulletin 65 (1999).
• Regulation of Franchisor Opportunism and the Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or Competition Between the States?, 23 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 61 (1999).
• Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1 (1997).
• Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 143 (1997).
• Will, Judgment and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due Proces Clause, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (1999).
• Antitrust Balancing in A (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 111 (1996).
• Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection for Shareholders, or Abridgement of Expression?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 305 (1993).
• Inadvertent Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis, 23 Creighton L. Rev. 513 (1990). (PDF)

Nathan Oman
Professor of Law

• Co-Author, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations are RFRA Persons, 127 Harvard L. Rev. F. 273 (2014) (with Alan Meese).
• Markets as a Moral Foundation of Contract Law, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 183 (2012).
• A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 Georgetown L. J. 77 (2009).
• The Failure of Economic Interpretations of Contract Damages, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 829 (2007).
• Book Review, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1483 (2005).
• Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 101 (2005).
• Statutory Interpretation in Econotopia, 25 Pace L. Rev. 49 (2004).

Sarah Wasserman Rajec

Professor of Law

• Free Trade in Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for Patents, 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 317 (2014).
• Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation, 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 733 (2012).

Sarah L. Stafford

Director of the William & Mary Program in Public Policy, Paul R. Verkuil Term Distinguished Professor of Public Policy and Professor of Economics and Law

• Do Carrots Work? Examining the Effectiveness of EPA's Compliance Assistance Program, 31 J. Policy Analysis and Management 533 (2012).
• Private Policing of Environmental Performance: Does it Serve Public Goals?, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 73 (2012).
• Co-author, Do Environmental Audits Improve Long-Term Compliance: Evidence from Manufacturing Facilities in Michigan, 40 J. Reg. Econ. 279 (2011).
• Outsourcing Enforcement: Principles to Guide Self-Policing Regimes, 33 Cardozo L. Rev. 2293 (2011).
• Self-policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime, 74 S. Econ. Rev. 934 (2008).
• Can Consumers Enforce Environmental Regulations? The Role of the Market in Hazardous Waste Commpliance, 31 J. Reg. Econ. 83 (2007).
• Should You Turn Yourself In: The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing, 26 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 305 (2007).
• Does Self-Policing Help the Environment? EPA's Audit Policy and Hazardous Waste Compliance, 6 Vermont J. Envt. L. 1 (2005).
• Progress Toward Title IX Compliance: The Effect of Formal and Informal Enforcement Mechanisms, 85 Soc. Sci. Qtr. 1469 (2004).